SAS trained for attack that never came

For a decade, Australia's Special Air Service Regiment had practised, prepared and waited for terrorists to attack Bass Strait oil rigs.

The attack never came and the Labor government of Bob Hawke decided that keeping an elite force at peak preparedness for an event of low likelihood just wasn't worth it.

Cabinet papers for 1990 and 1991, released by the National Archives of Australia, reveal that it was very expensive, costing an estimated $157 million over five years for just Bass Strait oil facilities, much more for North West Shelf and Timor Gap.

It involved an SAS tactical assault group trained to assault a terrorist-occupied oil platform. They could be inserted by helicopters, surface ships or submarines, all needing to conduct exercises to maintain capability.

This capability, centring on Bass Strait facilities, was declared ready in 1982. From 1985 that included North West Shelf facilities.

But by December 1990 when cabinet considered the issue, Bass Strait was less important. It was calculated that by 1995 it would provide just 20 per cent of Australian requirements as other fields came online.

The defence minister Robert Ray said maintaining such a high level of capability could not be easily justified.

No country had ever experienced a terrorist attack on an offshore oil rig and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation assessed the threat as low.

Cabinet agreed with Ray's proposal that readiness be set at a more realistic level, maintaining the necessary skills and equipment to build up a full capability if required.

The cabinet document does not record the reaction of former prime minister Malcolm Fraser, for it was he who demanded this special capability, overriding Defence officials who felt it wasn't all that necessary.

Through the 1970s and 1980s, Australia experienced a number of terror attacks, attributable to a range of factors, but the end of the Cold War and the end of Soviet support for some of the most active organisations seemed to point to a slowdown.

"Australia continues to be at risk from international terrorism. That threat is relatively low and likely to be manifest only episodically, but it carries the possibility of large loss of life," ASIO said in a cabinet briefing paper.

Curiously, there was significant concern about an influx of post-graduate students from Iran through the International Development Program, a consortium of Australian universities marketing tertiary education abroad.

So what threat was anticipated? We don't know as all relevant sections of the submission have been excised.

However, in its July 1990 memorandum on the international terrorism threat, ASIO said Iran was continuing a campaign against foreign dissidents with 17 attacks since 1987.

It was also complicit in terror attacks by the Lebanese group Hezbollah and was suspected of sponsoring the terrorist bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie in December 1988.

"Iran is now seen to be the principal proponent of state terrorism, ahead of Libya, Syria and Iraq," ASIO said.

Terrorism aside, the government was keen to improve relations with the largest customer in the world for Australian wheat and the largest market in the Middle East for primary and manufactured goods, worth $600 million in 1990.

Iran had emerged from the debilitating war with Iraq in August 1988, and under the new pragmatic regime of President Rafsanjani was keen to expand economic ties with the west.

Australian politicians including then foreign minister Bill Hayden had visited Iran and the country's foreign minister Ali Velayati was set to visit Australia in 1989.

It was delayed by the controversy over the novel The Satanic Verses which Iran deemed blasphemous. Its supreme leader called on all muslims to kill the book's author, English novelist Salman Rushdie.

To improve relations with Australia, Iran wanted to open a consulate in Sydney and for Australia to accept government-sponsored students.

The Department of Foreign Affairs noted that educating Iranian students would be good for bilateral relations and if Australia wasn't willing, they would go elsewhere.

As well, Iran had a good record of paying for goods and services and this could become a significant export earner for Australia.

The government imposed a ceiling of 350 students, though it wasn't about to tell that to Iran.

It also decided to seek details about each candidate's academic and employment background, rejecting those seeking admission to courses which could help develop Iran's nuclear, biological and chemical warfare capability.